Following the Juniper kernel flaw posts, we received a number of inquiries regarding how to determine the option value to use, however we were somewhat reluctant to provide that level of detail. Now that exploit code has been published elsewhere, there is little reason not to answer this question.
A report has been received from Juniper at 4:25pm under bulletin PSN-2010-01-623 that a crafted malformed TCP field option in the TCP header of a packet will cause the JUNOS kernel to core (crash).
What DNS Is Not by Paul Vixie details what DNS is by explaining what it is NOT.
In working with OSSEC agentless for some time now I have come across some limitations in the implementation that I felt needed to be addressed. As OSSEC agentless is designed to preform syscheck functions on remote hosts, more general features are hard (if not impossible) to write into a script. This post will demonstrate an alternative for adding additional features to the OSSEC standard build.
In my last OSSEC post “OSSEC: Agentless to save the day” I went over how to setup agentless monitoring using the built in scripts. With this post I am going to get into the details of how to modify the OSSEC supplied scripts to do your bidding.
OSSEC is a Host Intrusion detection system (HIDS) in name, but in reality it is far more. It’s able to look for rootkits, monitor logs (LIDS), and even actively respond to defined events. While all these features are great the unsung hero is agentless monitoring.
I attended SC World Congress in New York this week and a keynote from Cisco caught my attention: Securing the Cloud: Building the Borderless Network. I became fixated on the words used over and over by Joel McFarland. Borderless this, borderless that, borderless everything. This campaign started to bother me as this was [...]
Breaking up your network “is good,” we all know this, and VLANs have traditionally been used to segment a network to help with maintenance, management, and security; but, they are not the only game in town and often the wrong place to break your network into smaller and more efficient pieces. VPN Routing and [...]
But wait you say, are you trying to tell us that brute force password attacks will move to the API when I just read on the Twitter API wiki that the API severely limits the rate of calls you are allowed to make to it (200/hour/IP for authenticated requests without whitelisting)? That should be a mitigating control. Should be, but isn’t, because it is not enforced on all of the API calls.
